


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
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





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SPEECH

OF

Speech
MR. HILL, OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

ON

MR. BENTON'S EXPUNGING RESOLUTIONS.

*In Senate, May 27, 1836—*On Mr. BENTON'S expunging resolutions.

MR. PRESIDENT. The preamble and resolution of the Senator from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) which have been introduced as a substitute, are of that hermaphrodite character that pleases neither side, and being abandoned on all hands, must fall to the ground. They are only important so far as they countenance the principal argument that has been urged against expunging the record; and it is remarkable that the burden of the song has been, not that the condemnatory resolution was right, but that it was a violation of the constitution to expunge what was clearly wrong from the journal. "Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same." Here is a positive act to be performed; and when the act is done, the injunction is fully complied with. If it were intended to apply to all journals, as relating to this or that particular session of the Senate, the language would have been so definite as not to be mistaken. If it had been intended to keep and preserve the original manuscript journal, language conveying that idea would have been used. The mandate of the constitution has been fully complied with, when the journal has been kept a sufficient time to "publish the same." Copies are then multiplied, so there can be no mistake as to what the journal contained; and any subsequent vote of either House to expunge any particular part of any single copy of the journal, is no more a violation of the injunction to keep a journal, than it is of that part of the constitution which authorizes the people to elect members of the House of Representatives.

The Senator from Virginia, (Mr. Leigh,) probably as an offset to the resolutions recently passed by the Legislature of his State, directing the Senators from that State to present and vote for expunging the condemnatory resolution from the journal, a few days ago presented a memorial from John Timberlake, and others of that State, against ex-

punging. These memorialists consider the proposition to expunge to be "a plain and palpable violation of the constitution, and it is remarkable that they offer the following as the only reason against its constitutionality.

"Suffice it to say, that to their humble understandings, 'to keep,' as here used by the constitution, means to *preserve*, and that the latter clause of the constitutional provision, as previously quoted, furnishes a key to the interpretation of that which precedes it, since it would be obviously impossible to publish the journal from *time to time*, if such journal had not been *kept and preserved*."

Here is an admission that the journal is to be *preserved* only for the purpose of being *published*. What is the inference? It can be no other than that when thus kept, the whole purpose of the constitution has been complied with. I will hereafter make inquiry for what other purpose the journal can be kept. In relation to the keeping of the journal of the House of Representatives for thirty-five years, I have received information from the clerk in the following letters:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S.,
April 6, 1836.

DEAR SIR: In answer to the inquiry contained in your letter of this morning, I have to state that the original rough manuscript journal of the House of Representatives of the United States (those read on the mornings) have not been preserved to a period anterior to the commencement of the first session, eighteenth Congress, (1823, '4.)

For your further information, I enclose you a copy of a communication from Mr. Burch on the subject.

With very great respect, I am, sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. S. FRANKLIN,

Clerk H. R. United States.

HON. ISAAC HILL,
United States Senate.

OFFICE, HOUSE OF REPS. U. S.
April 6, 1836

I entered this office a youth, under John Beckley, who was the first clerk of the House of Representatives under the present Constitution of the United States, and who died in the year 1807.

During the recess of Congress he put me at what was termed "recording the journal" of the preceding session, which was to write it off from the printed copy into a large bound volume. I inquired of him why it was that it was copied, when there were so many printed copies? He answered that the printed copies would probably, in time, disappear from use, &c.—the large MS. volume would not.

The "rough journal," as it was then termed, and is still termed, being the original rough draft read in the House on the morning after the day of which it narrates the proceedings, was not, and had not, from the beginning, been preserved. I inquired the reason, and was answered, that the printed copy was the official copy, as it was printed under the official order of the House; and, as errors, which were sometimes discovered in the rough journal, were corrected in the proofs of the printed copy, the printed copy was the most correct, and that, therefore, there was no use in lumbering the office with the "rough journal" after it had been printed.

Two of Mr. Beckley's immediate successors in office, Mr. Magruder and Mr. Dougherty, viewed the matter as Mr. Beckley viewed it. I know the fact from having called their attention to the subject. I often reflected upon the subject, and it appeared to me to be proper that the "rough journal" should be preserved; although I could not see any purpose whatever to be answered by doing so. I often conversed with the clerks of the office upon the subject, but as we were only subordinates, the practice was not changed till 1st session of the 18th Congress, (1823, '4,) when I determined, without consulting my superior, that the "rough journal" should no longer be thrown away, but be preserved and bound in volumes; and it has been regularly preserved and bound since.

With great respect, I am, sir,
Your obedient servant.

S. BURCH.

Col. WALTER S. FRANKLIN,
Clerk House of Representatives U. S.

By these letters it appears that the original manuscript journal, the journal which is read in the morning of every day, succeeding that of the proceedings, was kept and preserved precisely long enough to answer the purpose designated by the memorial from Virginia. It was kept long enough to be published, when the original journal was destroyed or laid aside, and a new manuscript copy was taken from the printed published journal. Here are facts in relation to the journal that cannot be gainsayed; facts which prove, that even the destruction of the original manuscript journal, after that journal has been printed and published, was never dreamed to be a violation of that clause of the constitution, which requires each House of Congress to keep a journal of its proceedings. For the first thirty-five years, in

construing the constitution, plain common sense had not been driven from our legislative halls by the refinement of sophistry—the world of argument had not then been turned upside down—ingenuity had not then contrived to turn a plain duty of the representative to obey his constituents into a violation of his oath, and his conscience.

In the year 1823, the Senate of Massachusetts passed a resolution to expunge another resolution from their journal, passed in 1813, which the public sentiment had condemned. A member of the Legislature of that State for the present year, informed me that he recently examined the manuscript journal, containing both the expunged and expunging resolutions. Both of them were passed by an exact vote of the two political parties. The old federal party had the ascendancy in the Massachusetts Senate in 1813, and the resolution, that it was unbecoming a moral and religious people to rejoice in the success of our army and navy, was passed by the votes of that party alone; and in ten years afterwards, the first time the democratic party had the full ascendancy, that party voted to expunge the resolution from the journal. The constitution of Massachusetts requires the keeping of a journal, and directs that the yeas and nays of each branch of the Legislature shall be entered on that journal; but it does not require that this journal shall be published. In this it differs from the constitution of the United States in relation to the journals of Congress; but the distinction makes altogether in favor of the doctrine of expunging. In the case of Massachusetts, the resolution was expunged, but the manuscript journal (the only official copy in existence) was not touched. In our case, the condemnatory resolution may be expunged, and either the manuscript record may remain unmolested, or it may be ring-marked and crossed, or it may be entirely obliterated; and in neither case can it be considered a violation of the constitution, because, from the time the journal has been kept long enough to be published, every printed copy of that journal is an official copy, so that no vote to expunge, nor even any act of defacing the manuscript journal, can militate with the mandate of the constitution, which requires each House of Congress "to keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same," after the journal shall have been kept a sufficient length of time to be published.

Some thirteen years ago, I first visited the city of Washington, during the sitting of Congress. The Supreme Court of the United States was at the same time in session. A gentleman of the bar, now of the Senate, from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) was engaged before the court on one side of a case; and another gentleman from the same State, (Kentucky,) then, and now, a member of the House of Representatives, of somewhat rougher aspect, (Mr. Hardin,) argued the case on the other side. I listened attentively to both. The rougher gentleman, in the course of his argument, talked of the practice in Kentucky, and with great nonchalance informed the court how he gained an important land cause in that State. He created, he said, a *false* or *feigned* issue before the

sitting of the court, and led the antagonist party to confine his attention exclusively to the taking of testimony in relation to that feigned issue. Keeping the real point a secret from the adverse party, he carried his case at the trial by surprise. Marshall, and Rushrol Washington, then on the bench, smiled at the frank expression of the blunt attorney, who told the story as if he really thought he deserved credit for the trick.

There are many *feigned issues*, Mr. President; but few who practise them are as candid as was this Kentucky lawyer, before the Supreme Court. When the idea was first broached, that a resolution having no necessary reference to any existing laws could not be expunged from the legislative journal of the Senate, because the constitution requires the Senate to keep a journal of its proceedings, I would not have believed that such a feigned issue could be entertained so long as really to have assumed the appearance of settled seriousness. Surely, in all the expunging that heretofore has taken place, it never before entered into the heart of man to conceive such an objection as this.

It is said the constitution requires a journal to be kept; and therefore no part of this journal can be mutilated, struck out, or destroyed. If it be an imperative constitutional injunction to preserve, there must be some object to be gained by the preservation. The journal can be useful for no other purpose, than the preservation of evidence of proceedings.

All those parts of the journal relating to laws that have become obsolete, or to proceedings that are of no consequence, are valuable only as objects of curiosity, or as matters of history: the public interest could not suffer, if such parts were utterly destroyed. The journal of the Senate is kept and preserved for no other purpose, than to show when and how laws are passed, and it is of as much consequence to preserve the engrossed bill or resolution in that branch of the Legislature, in which such engrossed bill or resolution originated, as it is to preserve the journal of proceeding, to show the progress and history of the same bill or resolution. If both the engrossed bill and the journal were destroyed, the enrolled bill on parchment would remain, which would be evidence of the existence of the law; and even if that enrolled bill were destroyed, the law would still be in existence, if there remained any where published copies, which had been certified as from the original.

The object of possessing an official copy of the journal of legislative proceedings, is simply to preserve collateral evidence that existing laws passed in due course of legislation: other evidence than these journals, such as petitions on which laws are predicated, reports of committees on those petitions, minutes of reference, original drafts of bills or resolutions or amendments, may be equally important; and yet it will not be urged that the destruction or obstruction of these, either weakens the force of the law, or violates the constitution.

There are various ways in which the manuscript journal of the Senate may be obliterated or destroyed. The building may take fire, and that,

with the journal, may be accidentally burned: a thief may steal it, and carry it off, or bury it in the water or in the earth: the minutes may take fire during an evening session, and thus prevent the Secretary from copying the proceedings at length. The constitution requires a journal to be kept: would all these casualties or acts by which the journal shall be destroyed, be so many violations of the constitution?

Even if the resolution now under consideration, without reciting it, went so far as entirely to obliterate a former resolution that should be deemed improper to be retained on the journal, I cannot concede that the act of obliteration would be unconstitutional. If that resolution were an existing law, still intended to be kept in force, the act of obliteration would not nullify the law: applied to a simple declaratory resolution that was never intended to have the force of a law, the obliteration cannot harm the people for whose benefit all laws are made; and if it does not harm them, it can be no infringement of the constitution, such as is worthy of reprobation.

I marvel much at the pertinacity with which this question is attempted to be discussed as an infringement of the constitution. It seems to me that, by taking the ground they do, the opponents of the expunging resolution blink the real question: it has all the appearance of a mere subterfuge. The horns of this altar will not protect them—the cry of “a violated constitution,” as it is a virtual confession that the people are right in demanding the obliteration of an infamous record, so it furnishes strong presumptive evidence of consciousness that the resolution to be expunged was wrong in itself.

My object is not, Mr. President, so much to argue the question of power in the Senate to expunge, as to show that the sentence of condemnation passed on the President of the United States was not only extra-judicial, but unjust; for I conceive it to be a most inglorious evasion that Senators now say this sentence of condemnation imputed to the President no crime. If the Senators from Louisiana (Porter) and Virginia (Leigh) will look back to the criminal charges of “high crimes and misdemeanors” which were almost daily made in this body two years ago, they may well conclude that the people of the United States will repose little faith in the assertion now, that the resolution of April, 1834, imputed to the President of the United States no criminal intention. To show that it was the intention to impute the highest criminality to the President in the passage of that resolution, the speeches of more than one Senator who voted for it might be quoted. One single extract from the speech of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) after the resolution had passed, will serve my purpose:

IN SENATE, April 30, 1834.—Mr. Clay rose: “Never,” said he, “Mr. President, have I known or read of an administration which expires with so much agony, and so little composure and resignation, as that which now, unfortunately, has the control of public affairs in this country. It exhibits a state of mind feverish, fretful, and fidgety [a beautiful alliteration!] bounding ruth-

lessly from one expedient to another, without any sober or settled purpose.

"But I would ask in what tone, temper, and spirit does the President come to the Senate? As a great State culprit who has been arraigned at the bar of justice or sentenced as guilty? Does he manifest any of those compunctious visitings of conscience which a guilty violator of the constitution and laws of the land ought to feel? Does he address himself to a high court with the respect, to say nothing of humility, which a person accused or convicted, would naturally feel? No, no. He comes as if the Senate were guilty; and as if he were in the judgment seat, and the Senate stood accused before him. He arraigns the Senate; puts it upon trial; condemns it. He comes as if he felt himself elevated far above the Senate, and beyond all reach of the law, surrounded by unapproachable impunity. He who professes to be an innocent and injured man, gravely accuses the Senate, and modestly asks it to put upon its own record his sentence of condemnation! When before did the arraigned or convicted party demand of the court which was to try, or had condemned him, to enter upon their records a severe denunciation of their own conduct? The President presents himself before the Senate, not in the garb of suffering innocence, but in imperial and royal costume, as a detactor to rebuke a refractory Senate, to command it to record his solemn protest; to chastise it for disobedience."

Concluding:

"The Senator (Mr. Grundy of Tennessee) thinks that there is no coverlet large enough to protect all the various elements of the opposition. He is mistaken; there is one of sufficiently capacious dimensions, recently wove at a Jackson loom, called a protest, on which is marked a violation of the constitution, and an assumption of enormous Executive power; and the honorable Senator had better hasten to place himself under the banners of those who are contending against power and prerogative for free institutions and civil liberty. And he had better lose no time, for the protest is the last stroke upon the nail driven into the coffin (not of Jackson—may he live a thousand years!) but of Jacksonism!"

In a speech delivered at Concord, New Hampshire, in October, 1834, by a Senator (Mr. Webster) who voted for the condemnatory resolution, I find the following strong and positive assertions:

"It is true, that the operation commenced with the Branch Bank in this State, (New Hampshire.) It was tried to make that bank a political institution. Men here applied to the President to make the bank at Portsmouth a political bank. They wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury to do this. *These are facts*—made known to the world—not disputed."

"It never was asserted, then, that the bank was unconstitutional—that it was a 'monster.' And there was good reason for this silence. The bank had taken no part in politics; no one had been wicked enough to bring it into the political arena. It is as true as that our fathers fell at

Bunker's Hill, at Lexington, and at Monmouth, that this outcry against the bank was raised because the bank refused to be made a political engine."—*Same speech.*

This language was used by that honorable Senator about the same time that a committee of the Senate, commonly called the *Whitewashing Committee*, reiterated the same and other similar language in justification of the Bank and in condemnation of those who opposed its recharter.

I intend, in the remarks I have to make, to notice the charge that the "operation commenced" by an attempt on the part of the friends of the administration "to make the bank at Portsmouth a political bank;" and the statement that the bank "had taken no part in politics." The testimony on which the charge and disclaimer have been based, is the authority and word of the President of the bank. I shall confront these statements generally, with other statements coming from the same quarter; and if I shall fail to prove by the President of the bank, that the President of the bank and the aforesaid Senator charged falsely when he charged the attempt to make the Branch Bank at Portsmouth a political engine—if I shall fail to demonstrate, on the authority of the President of the bank himself, that he had entered, with all the money of the bank, into the political arena, I will concede that the friends of the bank have not been quite as much in the wrong as the enemies of the bank have alleged.

I understood the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) to say, there is no proof of abuses and misconduct of the Bank of the United States, unless we take charges against the bank for evidence against the bank. If he intends by this to justify the resolution of the Senate which condemned the President of the United States without a hearing—for it is presumed he would impute these unproved or false charges against the bank to the President, who has been assailed as the bank's greatest enemy—I will answer his allegation, that the President is guilty, by making the bank falsify its own charges, and disprove the bank's innocence by the confessions of the bank's own principal officer.

The Senator from Virginia says he is strictly and peculiarly a lawyer, meaning, I presume, a lawyer as contradistinguished from the legislator or the politician. Judging from the character of his speech alone on the expunging resolution, I agree that his description of himself is correct; for who so well as the mere lawyer can wrap up the plainest proposition in a web of metaphysical subtleties? To those who place implicit faith in him, all his propositions and deductions undoubtedly carry the weight of mathematical demonstration. To myself his whole speech appeared in the true character of the lawyer, who makes the most for his client; his argument was the reversal of that rule which every plain, unsophisticated mind would adopt to convince others of the truth as it had convinced itself; he seemed to entrench himself in a citadel of assumptions, applied to the case as he would have it; and he afterwards made all his facts precisely to conform to his assumptions. The late Thomas Addis Emmett was once concerned as associate counsel in a case with Aaron Burr, in which

the latter had the prior management. When the case was about coming to trial, Emmett asked Burr what facts they could prove in support of their client? The answer was, ask not what we can prove; rather ask what is necessary to be proved? Here is a specimen of the mere lawyer. It was in that early age of the practice probably, when the profession had not learnt to throw off, as legislators, their *ex parte* character as lawyers, that they were excluded from the British Parliament. "Sir Richard Baker, in his Chronicle, under the year 1736, records, that the House of Commons ordered that no man of the law should be returned as knight of the shire, and, if returned, that he should have no wages." I would by no means recur to this precedent as a parliamentary practice at this time binding on either House of Congress.

The point on which I would first comment, is the charge which has been so often repeated by the bank and its friends involved in "the controversy, relative to the removal of Mr. Mason from the presidency of the branch of New Hampshire." This charge was not conjured up until nearly three years after the events to which it alludes had transpired. It first made its appearance in the report of a single member of the committee of the House of Representatives "appointed on the 15th of March, 1832, to examine and report on the books and proceedings of the Bank of the United States."

The committee had been in session twenty-four days at Philadelphia, (from March 22d to April 14th) and were about to close the examination when the following proceeding was had:

"On motion of Mr. WATMOUGH,

"Resolved, That the President of the Bank of the United States be requested to furnish the committee with copies of the correspondence between himself and the Secretary of the Treasury, and Isaac Hill, late Second Comptroller of the Treasury, with reference to charges made against the official conduct of Jeremiah Mason, President of the United States Branch Bank in New Hampshire."

The correspondence, in manuscript, making more than forty closely printed pages, was produced by Mr. Biddle on the instant. It bore evident marks of age, having been thumbed till parts of it were scarcely legible. The majority of the committee, it is understood, before that day, had never heard of this correspondence, nor had it entered into the heart of mortal man concerned in this correspondence, excepting Nicholas Biddle himself, to conceive that it could be tortured into a purpose or use such as was afterwards made of it. If a majority of the committee had time or opportunity to scan this correspondence, they would by no means suppose that such an inference could be deduced from it, as seems to have been discovered by the keen optics of a single member, (Mr. J. Q. Adams,) and afterwards concurred "fully in all the statements made, and principles developed," by another member of the minority (Mr. J. G. Wadsworth.) Mr. Adams's report relative to this correspondence was in the words following:

"The complaints made against the president of

the bank at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the summer of 1829, and the correspondence between the board at Philadelphia and the late Secretaries of the Treasury and of War, form a portion of the documents relating to the books and proceedings of the bank, called for by the committee and communicated to them. They are not noticed in the report of the chairman, but, in the opinion of the subscriber, *are more deserving of the attention of Congress and of the nation, than any other part of the papers commented upon in the report.* An effort, very thinly veiled, on the part of two of the executive departments of the General Government, to exercise a control, political and pecuniary, over the proceedings of the bank and its branches—a control highly exceptionable in principle, and even contrary to law, appears to him to be fully disclosed in those papers. He will not permit himself to inquire into the motives of the agents in those transactions. It is sufficient for the protection of the public interest that the projected encroachments of power were disconcerted and laid aside."

So much for the high accusations made by Mr. Adams against "two of the executive departments of the General Government." It would, perhaps, be a sufficient answer—an answer that would forever shut the mouths of all accusers—to quote the statement of Mr. Ingham in relation to this matter, written in June, 1832, near the time at which Mr. Adams's report first appeared. At the time of writing this letter, Mr. Ingham was no friend of the administration; and from the temper he discovered after leaving the office of Secretary of the Treasury, it might well be expected that he would be no less willing to see any charge of "projected encroachments of power" established against the administration, than even Mr. Adams himself. Noticing the unauthorized publication of a confidential correspondence nearly three years after it took place, and the accusation made in the report of Mr. Adams, Mr. Ingham, in a letter published in the Philadelphia Sentinel, says:

"But my motives were misunderstood, and I myself friendly purposes wholly disappointed, and I now found myself virtually accused of a desire to exert the power of the Government to seduce the bank from its vestal purity, into a base political connexion with the administration.

"Having been promulgated by an ex-President of the United States in the legislative hall, and thus openly by a *director of the bank*, [by a Mr. Platt, at a public hotel in Trenton, undertaking to vouch for the truth of Mr. Adams's statement,] it cannot fail to justify this notice. To be silent would be to sanction for truth *what I know to be false*, and deeply prejudicial to my character."

"When the friendly purpose of my letter is duly appreciated, in connexion with the repeated declarations pressed upon me of the political abuses of certain branch banks, in corroboration of which it was added that the selections of directors were, in many branches, made entirely from one political party, it should be rather a matter of surprise that my suggestions should be so little obnoxious even to severe and suspicious

criticism. It requires but little knowledge of the human character to know, that no bank can be faithfully and impartially conducted where the directors are selected from one sect, whatever its character may be, provided their selection is made with a view to their sectarian opinions; and when directors are found thus arranged, however pure they may be, it will be almost impossible to satisfy even an enlightened public opinion, that there may not have been some design in the arrangement. The obvious and natural means to prevent abuse in such a case, as well as to satisfy public opinion, and even to confound clamor, (which is sometimes necessary in the administration of public affairs,) is to give some variety to the organization of the board.—Such were the reflections which induced the suggestion of forming suitable ‘checks and counterbalances’ to preserve a proper equilibrium in the management of the institution; a measure in its conception purely admonitory and preservative, not only tending to prevent the pernicious influence of political bias in the operations of the bank, but incapable of being perverted to such abuse; suggested, too, by the constitutional representative of one-fifth of the whole stock; *forms the solitary point, left by Mr. Biddle, on which it is to be presumed Mr. Adams has founded his grave and solemn charge.* I shall not now attempt to show the difference between a measure proposed to prevent, and one to promote an abuse, nor enter upon a discussion of the rights of the constituent or representative to advise the agent, or attempt to prove that what might properly have been addressed to the directors appointed by the President might, with the same propriety, be addressed to the whole board. The question of right is too clear to admit of a doubt. The character of the proceeding must therefore depend on its fitness, and the motives which induced it, on whatever grounds it shall be placed, I am content to be judged by a discerning public.

“Of Mr. Adams, however unwarrantable his attack upon me, it seems most fit that I should say as little as possible. A great man has said of him ‘that he could not see the truth;’ this case is a striking example of the wisdom of that observation.”

Mr. Ingham says, in the same letter, “the Secretary of the Treasury, for the time being, is exclusively responsible for all the sentiments contained in his correspondence.”

This explanation of Mr. Ingham, who surely could have no interest to exculpate any person in the administration other than himself, would seem to be sufficient. So far as relates to one of the two departments, he takes to himself exclusively the responsibility, and denies any and every attempt to exercise an exceptionable or unlawful control on the part of the government of either the bank or any of its branches.

Yet in the face of this positive denial of Mr. Ingham, the directors of the bank (in a report adopted by a vote of twelve to three, December 3, 1833, many thousands of which report were gratuitously circulated, and paid for out of the friends of the bank) reiterate the charge in the following words:

“It was in the midst of this career of inoffensive usefulness, when soon after the accession to power of the present Executive, the purpose was distinctly revealed that other duties than those to the country were required; and that it was necessary for the bank, in administering its affairs, to consult the political views of those who had now obtained the ascendancy in the Executive. *It is understood that soon after that event, a meeting was held in Washington of the principal chiefs, to consider the means of perpetuating their new authority, and the possession of the bank was among the most prominent objects of the parties assembled.* The first open manifestation of the purpose was in June, 1829, when a concerted effort was made by the executive officers to interfere in the election of the board of directors at Portsmouth. At the head of this attempt was Mr. Levi Woodbury, now a member of the present Cabinet at Washington, who did not hesitate to avow in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, which, though marked ‘confidential,’ was subsequently ordered to be published by the committee of investigation in 1832,* that he wished the interference of the Government, to remove the President of the branch at Portsmouth. * * * This letter of Mr. Woodbury was transmitted to the bank by the Secretary of the Treasury, who stated that ‘from some expressions in his letter, it may be inferred that it is partly founded on a supposed application of the influence of the bank, with a view to political effect,’ in consequence of which, he deemed it his duty to present it to the bank, *‘with the views of the administration in relation to it.’* At the same time, Mr. Isaac Hill, acting as the Comptroller of the Treasury, until rejected by the Senate, and now a Senator of the United States, sent a memorial from the members of his political party in the Legislature of New Hampshire, requesting the removal of Mr. Mason. In another communication presented to the bank, he gave it as his opinion that no measure, short of Mr. Mason’s removal, could tend *‘to reconcile the people of New Hampshire to the bank,* and that the friends of General Jackson, in New Hampshire, have had but too much reason to complain of the management of the branch at Portsmouth.’ Finally, the Secretary at War ordered the transfer of the pension fund from the branch bank at Portsmouth, to another bank in Concord, an act so obviously in violation of the laws, that it was first resisted by the bank, and then retracted by the Secretary.”

“It became then manifest to the bank, that there was a combined effort to render the institution subservient to political purposes, and that it was necessary to come to some immediate and distinct understanding of its rights and duties.”

To sustain this reiteration of an already exploded charge, the managers of the bank are obliged to resort to a fiction of their own invention, for which there is not even the slightest pretence of a foundation. They say “it is understood that soon after that event, a meeting was held in Washington of the principal chiefs, &c., and the possession of the bank was among the

—“This is not true: the committee never directed the publication. It was Mr. Biddle himself, who, without asking liberty from the writers, shamelessly exposed this correspondence.

most prominent objects of the parties assembled." Now if there be any foundation for this story, could not the gentlemen directors furnish some better evidence than a mere "it is understood?" Of these "principal chiefs," have we not a right to suppose that either Mr. Ingham or the two other disaffected members of the Cabinet who retired with him, must have had some knowledge? and has not each of them discovered at least an inclination to expose before the public any and every transaction which might go to disgrace the administration? The alleged meeting is disproved by every circumstance which can go to establish a negative! The facts of the case itself, and among them the fact fully established by the correspondence that the ground of complaint against Mr. Mason was not political, demonstrate that both the alleged meeting and its objects were the mere inventions of a mind predetermined to seek a plausible pretext for an accusation of some sort.

It will not be denied that the object of some of the petitioners for a change in the Board of Directors of the Portsmouth branch, was an exemption from that exclusive political management which had been practised for years at that branch. It was a matter of notoriety, that up to that time every member of the Board was opposed to the administration; and for the last three years, the bank had been managed (whether with or without the sanction of the Directors of the mother bank) with a view to political favoritism. The bank had been before, as almost every branch bank has been since, a political machine, operating on the elections. At the time of the first election of President Jackson, all the Directors were active partisans against him; and in time of scarcity, money accommodations were understood to be granted as a matter of political favor.

This political management of the Bank had proved to be bad management. Mr. Biddle, in a letter to Mr. Ingham, of July 18, 1829, says: "The office at Portsmouth had originally the misfortune to have at its head a Mr. Cutts, who ended by defrauding the United States of upwards of \$20,000 of the pension fund, which the Bank was obliged to replace; and last year the office was nearly prostrated, in the general ruin which spread over the country. Out of \$460,000 of loans, \$148,000 was thrown under protest: still further protests were expected, and the actual loss sustained there will not be less than \$112,000. * * * A confidential officer was despatched to Portsmouth, who found the affairs of the office in great jeopardy, covered with the wrecks which bad management and the most extensive frauds had occasioned. To retrieve it, it became necessary to select a man of the first rate character and abilities: such a man was Mr. Mason."

To correct the "bad management," and "extensive frauds," there was at no time a change of direction: the same individuals from that, to the end of the chapter, continued to control the bank—the same political coterie at all times wielded it as their weapon of influence. Mr. Mason was appointed President—he had been a director and attorney for the bank before that time; and he remained associated in the Board with the same men that controlled it at the time of

"bad management," and the "most extensive frauds." Mr. Biddle himself says, "Mr. Mason is only one member of that board, consisting of the same gentlemen *who have had charge of the branch for many years.*"

But the management under Mr. Mason, became from "bad" to "worse." The most profitable and safe business of the bank had been its country loans made in sums of from \$500 to \$2000 each, under an agreement that the interest and ten per cent. of the principal should be checked in every four months. As the bank had lost in its large loans, to speculators in factory and other stocks, Mr. Mason took it into his head that the small debtors were less safe than the large ones; and violating the plighted faith of the bank, by a circular letter, called on all to renew their notes every two months, and at each renewal, to pay twenty per cent. of the principal. This course, rigidly pursued, created a panic at once; and Mr. Mason still further contributed to the distress, by taking a large sum from the circulation, and loaning it in Boston to his own particular friends and connexions.

Within the town of Portsmouth, the excitement against Mr. Mason became almost universal among the business men. It was charged on him, that he arbitrarily changed (by shortening) the periods of payments of paper amounting to several hundred thousand dollars, reducing the time for renewals from one hundred and twenty to sixty days, and increasing each call from ten to twenty per cent.; that the best paper in the State was refused discount; that he made a run upon one of the local banks, with a view to stop it; and refused drafts at sight on a Boston bank, and denied the Portsmouth bank time even to send (a six hour's ride) to Boston, for its money there in deposit; that the papers, under which the revolutionary pensioners had usually drawn, were rejected upon capricious and technical objections. In consequence of these reasons, and mainly for the reason that he threw into jail a citizen, (one of his own political party,) by virtue of a process which, as a lawyer, he issued against him, because he failed to comply with the requisition which, as President, he exacted in violation of the terms on which loans were made, the public indignation against Mr. Mason became so strong, that his image was hung, and burnt in effigy in front of his own dwelling.

Mr. Mason had been placed in the office of President and attorney of the bank under a compensation raised from \$800 to \$2000 per annum. Mr. Biddle, in his letter to Mr. Ingham, speaking of Mr. Mason says:—"Of his entire competency, especially in detecting the complicated frauds, and managing the numerous law suits which seemed inevitable, there could be no doubt." "Since he has been in office, he has been exceedingly useful—has saved the bank from great losses—has secured the bad debts; nor until Mr. Woodbury's letter, was I informed of any complaint against him."

If the bank had intended to make severe exactions of the people, Mr. Mason was the man of all others to do their business; but he was not the man to manage an office of discount and deposits either for the benefit of the bank or to the satisfaction of men of business; and the result proved

the truth of my proposition. A tabular statement, furnished by the bank, presents the following as the profits on the business of the Portsmouth branch bank:

In 1828,	-	-	-	\$25,903	80
1829,	-	-	-	9,697	04
1830,	-	-	-	5,164	16

The truth is, Mr. Mason's severe treatment and violation of the plighted faith of the bank, at once drove from it its most profitable customers, so that in two years the profits of that branch were reduced to less than one-fifth the ordinary amount.

These were the causes which induced fifty-eight respectable individuals and firms, comprising most of the active business-men in Portsmouth, to petition the President and Directors of the mother bank for a change of the President of the branch at the end of his term. Of these fifty-eight houses, thirty-eight at least were men of the same political party as Mr. Mason. The most of them remain of that party; and as a proof that the main reason for petitioning for a substitution was not political, I may state the fact, that twenty-four of these names appear on the only petition for a restoration of the deposits to the Bank of the United States, which was presented from New Hampshire during the season of panic and distress of the session of Congress two years ago.

Scarcely any worse condition of the bank could be conceived than that represented by Mr. Biddle himself. He says:—"A confidential officer had been despatched to Portsmouth, who found the affairs of the office in great jeopardy, covered with the wrecks which bad management and the most extensive frauds had occasioned." Further on, he admits that no change had been made for the better, for he says: "Mr. Mason is only one member of that Board, consisting of the same gentlemen who have had charge of the branch for many years."

It was against such a state of things as this, that respectful representations were made by citizens of all parties in Portsmouth, (and a major part of those citizens, men who had never supported the administration of Andrew Jackson, and men who did not support him so late as the winter of 1834, in the act of the removal of the deposits,) in favor of a change of the President, and direction of the branch at Portsmouth. And it was at the especial instance of those citizens, of all parties, that about sixty members of the Legislature of New Hampshire subscribed their names to another petition, recommending a change of the direction, and naming ten persons, a majority of whom was not, at that time, friends of the administration, as suitable for directors to that branch. Neither did Mr. Woodbury or Mr. Hill move in this business of their own accord, but at the especial request of the same citizens of Portsmouth, a major part of whom were then, and since have continued to be, of the opposition to this administration.

Mr. Woodbury, in a confidential letter to Mr. Ingham, requests him to lend "any aid for the relief of the complainers that he can with propriety furnish." He says "our commercial men are almost unanimous in their complaints, and the people in the interior, who were wont to be accommodated formerly at the branch, join with them in a desire for the removal of the present

President." "In making these general representations, I am repeating what are in the mouths of almost every citizen, of whatever political denomination, and am inviting, at the request of many, your influence at the mother Bank, in producing a change." "Never, on any occasion, have I known complaints so wide and bitter as in the case now under consideration."

We have just seen how completely Mr. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treasury, exonerates all others than himself from any intention of assuming political control over the bank, and how he likewise demonstrates, that in making the representation he did, he disclaimed "all desire to derive political aid through the bank." Mr. Biddle himself shall speak of what were the motives of Mr. Woodbury. In his letter of July 18, 1829, to Mr. Ingham, he says: "It appears, then, from Mr. Woodbury's own statement, that, so far from employing the influence of the bank," with a view to political effect, "it is a notorious fact that the complaints are made by Mr. Mason's own political friends; so that, in truth, if there be any politics in the matter, it is a question between Mr. Mason and politicians of his own pursuit."

Is it not surprising, that in the lapse of little more than a year afterwards, Mr. Biddle should represent Mr. Woodbury, as at the "head of the attempt" to create a political subservency of the bank to the administration? And this charge is made by him in the pamphlet report of a committee of directors of the Bank of the United States, adopted by the Board, December 3, 1833. May we not account for this discrepancy in the change of circumstances of the case? In July, 1829, there was not even an expectation of charging the efforts made for the removal of the President of the Portsmouth branch, to a design of the administration to convert the bank into a political instrument in its own hands; while in December, 1833, it became highly important that the directors of the bank should fix on certain unnamed "political chiefs" as having "distinctly revealed" that other "duties than those to the country were required" of the bank.

In the same pamphlet, for the purpose of strengthening the charge of a "desire to derive political aid through the operations of the bank," the humble part I acted in forwarding the wishes of the citizens of Portsmouth, without distinction of party, is misrepresented, by quoting from my letter detached sentences going to show that my application had a bearing exclusively political. Then holding a subordinate station in one of the accounting departments of the Treasury, I was absent a few weeks in New Hampshire. While at my place of residence, which is the seat of government, a messenger, who had arrived the day before from Portsmouth, presented the petition, subscribed by fifty-eight individual firms of Portsmouth, addressed to the Directors of the Bank of the United States, remonstrating against the reappointment of Mr. Mason as a director of the branch at Portsmouth, and representing that "the administration of its concerns during the past year has created great dissatisfaction in this quarter of the country, and has been of a character, in our opinion, partial, harsh, and no less injurious to the bank itself than to those who are

accustomed to do business with it," and also a memorial, signed by between fifty and sixty members of the State Legislature, representing that they "have good reason to believe that the late management of the Board of Directors of the Branch Bank at Portsmouth has been oppressive to the men of business in the State, and tends to the injury of the institution itself;" "that the conduct of the head of the Board has been destructive to the business of Portsmouth, and offensive to the whole community;" and respectfully naming ten individuals who are recommended as candidates for directors. This petition and memorial he requested me to take on my return to Washington, and cause them to be laid before the President of the mother bank. Passing rapidly through Philadelphia, I had no time to see or consult with the president and directors, with whom I had no personal acquaintance. I did, however, consult with two gentlemen whom I knew, who engaged to lay the matter before the president of the bank, whenever I should forward the papers from Washington. It is my letter to those two gentlemen that Mr. Biddle not only took and used as a public letter, but the contents of which he has distorted, for the purpose of forcing an inference that I was interfering in accordance with the design of certain "political chiefs" at Washington, to corrupt the vestal purity of the bank, and entice or drive it "into a base political connexion with the administration."

The following extracts, embracing the whole scope of the private letter which I addressed to Messrs. Barker and Pemberton of Philadelphia, under date of July 17, 1829, decisively prove that my object, so far as I had an object, was entirely misrepresented in the pamphlet of the Bank Directors:

"Having recently spent several weeks in New Hampshire, I am able to say, from my own knowledge, that the sentiment of dissatisfaction on account of the recent management of the branch at Portsmouth, by Mr. Mason, is general; that his conduct has been partial and oppressive, and calculated not less to injure the institution than to disgust and disaffect the principal business men, and that no measure short of his removal will tend to reconcile the people of New Hampshire to the Bank. * * *

"The friends of General Jackson in New Hampshire have had but too much reason to complain of the management of the branch at Portsmouth. All they now ask is, that this institution in that State may not continue to be an engine of political oppression by any party. The board has, I believe, invariably and exclusively consisted of individuals opposed to the General Government. Of the ten persons named in the petition for directors, six are friends of the last, and four are friends of the present administration; they are, however, alike, gentlemen of respectability, who have no sinister objects to be promoted, understanding well the responsibilities and wants of business men. With such a direction, I do not doubt the branch at Portsmouth will be secure and prosperous, and satisfy all."

Under these representations the President of the bank visited Portsmouth, and is understood to have exhibited every written representation made to him, confidentially or otherwise, to the eyes or

the ears of the assembled citizens of the town; and the well known talent of his principal officer, for small verbal criticism and for ridicule, was put in requisition for an exhibition of the letters and petitions before the people. It was soon discovered to be no part of Mr. Biddle's object to listen to the complaints of the people, whether with or without foundation. He came there for no such purpose. It was no part of his object to satisfy that community by any relaxation of severity, but rather to conquer the revolting spirit by letting all know who wanted any indulgence from the bank, how much and how deeply they were under obligations to his favor. The exclusive political rule of that bank, from that day to the day it was closed, was continued. A directorship has in two or three instances been offered to friends of the existing administration, and, being obliged to act as mere automatons, each of them, it is believed, has declined to act.

That this bank, existing there for about eighteen years, without taxation from the State, and having all the benefits of the public deposits during a greater part of the time, has been of real injury to the State, must be admitted. At first furnishing, by extraordinary capital that could not be usefully employed, strong temptations for speculation, this bank terminated the career, by prostrating in pecuniary ruin, many men who might have done a safe business through life if temptations had not been thrown in their way to make investments by loans from the bank.

The charge in the "directors' pamphlet, of an effort at Washington "to render the institution subservient to political purposes," by the order of the War Department to transfer the pension fund from the branch bank at Portsmouth to another bank at Concord, but illy accords with the other charge which I have at length been considering. If, in the one case, the attempt had been to create a subserviency on the part of the bank by changing the political character of the directors, where would be the consistency in depriving the bank at the same time of what seems now to have been a privilege, but which, until that time, had always been represented to be a burden? The truth is, that a majority of the Legislature of New Hampshire, having been always taught by those concerned in the United States Bank, that the bank coveted not the privilege of paying the pensioners, petitioned the Secretary of War to remove the fund to a more central point, which would make the average distance of travel for each and every pensioner from twenty-five to thirty miles less. In several other States, up to that time, pensions had been paid by agencies other than those of the Bank of the United States and its branches. The Secretary of War, doubting not his right, because it had not before been disputed, directed the pension agency to be changed. This direction and change threw new light on the subject. The Bank of the United States, to magnify its services to the public and make them more than an equivalent for its exclusive privileges, had represented the holding and disbursing of the public moneys as extremely onerous. But Mr. Mason presents an entirely different view of the subject, which he offers as a reason why the bank should resist the transfer of agencies. He says:

"The removal contemplated would lessen our means of circulation, and, as I think, be *very injurious* to the bank." It is difficult to perceive how the other of "the two Executive Departments," the Secretary of War, should have been acting in concert with the Secretary of the Treasury, when he directed the pension agency to be removed from a bank which the latter was attempting to control, to another bank over which, by possibility, he had no right of control. It appears to me that the "two Executive Departments," if designing to do what they are charged with doing, were acting directly at cross purposes.

Connected with this subject of alleged interference of the Executive to render the institution subservient to political purposes, is the charge made against the President of having from the outset entertained a violent hostility to the bank and its management. This charge is countenanced by the whitewashing report of the Finance Committee of 1834; it is more particularly set forth in the pamphlet of the directors, after having alleged that they valiantly resisted all the wicked attempts of the Executive to sully the pure honor of the bank by forcing them to become politicians, when they say—

"These extracts reveal the whole secret of the hostility to the bank of those who, finding it impossible to bend it to their purposes, have resolved to break it. For this purpose, all the poisoned weapons of political warfare have, for the last four years, been unsparingly and unceasingly employed against the institution."

This charge upon the veteran statesman and patriot comes with an ill grace from the man who had for four successive years been nominated by the President of the United States to the office of director of the bank. Mr. Adams himself, in his minority report, makes the boast "that Mr. Biddle had enjoyed the unquestioned and entire confidence both of the Government and the individual stockholders." "Ten long years," continues Mr. A., "has this confidence been enjoyed and justified by that distinguished citizen and honorable man. No question had ever been invidiously started how many proxies he held? The more he held, the more extensive was the confidence of the stockholders in him. No scruple had ever crossed the mind of any President of the United States to deter him from nominating him year after year as a Government director."

Where has this man found occasion, in his own person, to say that the President interfered against him or his management until after the election of 1832? When did President Jackson "distinctly reveal" to president Biddle, that he required "other duties" of him "than those due to the country?" When did the patriot statesman give Mr. Biddle to understand that it was necessary for the Bank to "consult the political views of those who had obtained the ascendancy in the Executive?" Could it be possible that this immaculate institution, with its immaculate guardian genius and head, should have preserved their vestal purity for four years? should have successively resisted every assault upon their virtue, and repelled the lawless assailant; and at the same time enjoyed for the whole term the "unquestioned and

entire confidence" of its inamorato? The charge of seduction or force attempted upon the bank is false—it is an after thought, an accusation which will return "but to plague the inventors."

The whitewashing report of the Committee of Finance of 1834, bears evident marks of being the production of more than one hand. The largest half of this report, if I might be permitted to give an opinion, I would say came from the same quarter as have most of the whitewashing reports that had preceded it; that it scents of the shop, so that its author may be detected as one of the banking fraternity, whose business is to regulate the rise and fall of stocks and the course of exchange. Observe the expression on page 42, line 12 from the bottom, of "*drafts in this office.*" This expression, isolated as it is, and referring with certainty to no particular place, one would think could never have been made by one of the committee. Referring, as it evidently does, to the office at Philadelphia, ill-nature might say it could have been written only by a tenant of the marble house. Critics would offer this as one of the external evidences, that the larger portion of the apology for the bank came from the bank itself. I must do the gentlemen on the committee the justice to say, that I believe either of them would, after an application of two months, during the recess of Congress, have produced a more creditable production than the larger part of this report—a report so meagre in accurate facts, and yet so fruitful in matters for conjecture; a report which reluctantly admits what it cannot conceal, and poorly attempts to cover up what it had better have exposed to the world.

I give my belief that the report is not all produced by the same hand; I would not positively say it is part from the bank and part from the committee. When the report says, on page 1, "every facility was afforded by the officers of the institution which the committee could have desired;" that "no hesitation or reluctance was manifested in furnishing every book or paper which was required; and every avenue to a full and free investigation, not only at the bank, but at the several branches visited by the committee or any member of it, was promptly laid open;" when the report speaks thus, we would scarcely believe the language to be that of the committee. But when the report, on page 46, says, "the directors should carefully have avoided every appearance of mystery, nor should they have consented to place the president in a situation so full of embarrassments;" that "the committee owe it to themselves to state, that they submitted to the president the propriety of disclosing the objects of expenditure;" that "the president averred that the bank could not have the least difficulty in making an ample and minute detailed disclosure of every item of expenditure, so far as the bank itself or its officers were concerned, but urged the delicacy and justice, in his opinion, of refraining from disclosures which would most probably expose others, every way innocent, to vituperation, malignant aspersion, and, peradventure, personal vengeance;" that "he averred his willingness to verify, under any form of solemnity,

in any way agreeable to the committee, for what the expenditure *had not been made*—that no portion of it had been made to subsidize any portion of the public press, or tamper with or affect the purity of any public functionary, but reverted to the delicacy and possible danger of exposing innocent persons to odium or persecution; when the report speaks after this sort, I should be more than half inclined to the belief that some one of the committee had a hand in producing a part of it.

What a singular anomaly does the whitewashing report of the Finance Committee present! The first statement is, that there was no concealment—that every thing was thrown open to the view of the committee, and by the committee to the world. The last statement is nearly a full page of apology for concealment of every thing that the president of the bank supposed would make against him. Such a palpable contradiction, in a report of this kind, stamps its character as scarcely more reputable than that of the subject on which it treats. We may believe such a report, so far as it admits truth that makes against the bank: we can place no confidence in such assertions, without proof, as make any thing in its favor.

I have been forcibly struck, Mr. President, with the keenness of sensibility evinced by the bank and its friends at every imputation of its intention to interfere with the politics of the country. From the first of January to the last of December of every year since 1829, the burden of the song has been, that the bank keeps itself entirely aloof from politics. Under the date of June 19, 1829, we find Mr. Biddle writing to the Secretary of the Treasury:

“The officers of the bank and all its branches are thoroughly imbued with this spirit, knowing, as they do, that their interference in political contentions would be highly offensive to the general administration of the institution.”

“I believe there are not in the whole country any other five hundred persons, of equal intelligence, so abstracted from public affairs, as the five hundred who are employed in administering the bank; and I am satisfied that no loan was ever granted to, or withheld from any individual, on account of partiality or hostility.”

“In the choice of its agents and the distribution of its loans, it should be wholly indifferent to political parties.”

“In general, the class of persons actively engaged in political contentions, as well from their own wants, as from the train of adherents, whose claims they are too prone to support, are among the most dangerous inmates of a bank.”

Again, General Cadwalader, acting president of the bank in the absence of Mr. Biddle, writes, under date of August 4, 1829, to the Secretary of the Treasury:

“If, however, it can be shown that, in any quarter, the officers of the bank have lent themselves as the ministers of a party, or have used the power of the corporation for political purposes, not a moment will be lost in visiting such offences with the utmost severity of censure and punishment.”

How graphically, in the one case, does Mr. Biddle present, in contrast the five hundred officers of the bank operating throughout the Union in

the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1832 and 1834, and the army of hired and purchased and dependent “train of adherents,” who fought like bullies to overpower the people at those elections; and how truly in the other case does General Cadwalader and his Board of Directors exhibit the picture of deformity which must attach to officers of the bank, who stand condemned out of their own mouths.

The correspondence of Mr. Biddle is full of similar expressions of detestation, at all attempts to make the bank instrumental of promoting political or party purposes. So much for 1829: we find the case a *little* altered in 1830. In that year the Board gave their president authority to circulate an article on banks and currency, (for *writing* and not *printing* which, Mr. Biddle paid Mr. Albert Gallatin, it is said, \$1,000,) published in the American Quarterly Review, containing a favorable notice of the bank.

In 1831, Mr. Biddle suggested to the Board of Directors the “expediency and propriety of extending still more widely a knowledge of the concerns of the institution;” and a resolution passed the Board, authorizing the president to cause to be prepared and circulated, such documents and papers as may communicate to the people information in regard to the operations of the bank.”

The directors of the bank say, in their pamphlet of 1833, that the expenses incurred, as stated in the expense account, in executing these resolutions, from December, 1829, *when the first assault was made upon the bank by the President*, to the present time, &c., amount to \$58,265.05, &c.

“So that the general result is, that within four years past, the bank has been obliged to incur an expense of \$58,000 to defend itself against injurious misrepresentation.”

I wish the following sentence from the bank pamphlet, published in December 1833, should be particularly noted:

“*The bank has never interfered in the slightest degree in politics, and never influenced, or sought to influence, elections; but it will not be deterred by the menaces or clamors of politicians, from executing its duty in defending itself.*”

This was said and solemnly declared to the world in the latter part of 1833. February 4, 1834, the Committee of Finance of the Senate of the United States gave their countenance to the above declaration, as will be seen in the following extracts:

“The last charge preferred against the bank, by Mr. Taney, is, that it has used its means with a view to obtain political power, and thereby secure a renewal of its charter.

“The very statement of such a charge, as a reason for the removal of the deposits, is calculated to excite distrust in the wisdom and propriety of that measure; because the charge, too general to be proved, is also too general to be disproved.”

“Nor is it either acknowledged, nor so far as the committee know, proved, that the bank took an open and direct interest, as a corporation, in the election referred to,” (the Presidential election of 1832.)

Even the report of the Committee of Finance, made at the last session of Congress, condemns the interference of the bank in the elections. It says: "For a great moneyed corporation, created to subserve the purposes of the country, to lend itself to party, and to enter through its moneyed power, in any way, into the political struggles of the day, would be to render it truly and deservedly odious."

The committee published several letters of anterior dates, in which Mr. Biddle denies all interference of the bank in politics; from them I select the following sentences:

Letter to J. Harper, Esq., Lexington, Kentucky, dated January 9, 1829

"I have myself an extreme unwillingness to blend politics with the concerns of the bank. Nearly all its misfortunes may be traced to this cause, and in your section of the country we have surely had a melancholy experience of the hazard of lending to politicians." What politicians are meant here?

Letter to E. Sheppen, Esq., Louisville, Kentucky, February 12, 1829.

"That the offices in Kentucky had suffered deeply from the influence of politicians; that we had for some time been endeavoring to withdraw the bank out of the reach of that influence; that we had at length succeeded in giving a business character to its transactions," &c.

Letter to J. Johnson, Esq., Charleston, (S. C.) September 30, 1830.

"In the administration of the Bank of the United States, no principle is more fundamental, than its total abstinence from politics, &c.

These and other letters, and extracts of letters from Mr. Biddle, were published by the whitewashing committee, for no other seeming purpose than to produce an impression on the public mind, that the managers of the bank had such an innate abhorrence of politics and politicians, that it might be safely sworn the bank retained, down to the year the report was made, its vestal virgin purity; and had never interfered at all in politics.

But could that committee believe the American people so destitute of common sense, as not to discover, even from the scanty evidence which their report exhibited, that the allegation is false; that the bank has abstained from direct and positive interference in the elections; and that the Board of Directors, and all those who have given currency to their statement of December, 1833, that "the bank has never interfered in the slightest degree in politics, and never influenced, or sought to influence elections," stand convicted of untruth in its deepest and broadest sense?

This unpardonable departure from the truth, constituting a criminality even more flagrant than the acts of interference themselves, may be proved in some fifty or a hundred cases. I shall content myself in this place, to cite one only.

As a prelude to an exhibition of the sums paid for publications by the bank, to partizan editors and others, the committee exhibit a letter from Nicholas Biddle, under date of September 26, 1832, to the president of the Lexington, Kentucky, Branch Bank, sending therewith a copy of Mr. Webster's

speech on the President's veto message, and also an article reviewing that message. These he states, it is desirable should be circulated, to counteract the injurious impressions which the message was calculated to make against the institution. He also directs the publication of Mr. Clay and Mr. Ewing's speeches on the same subject, and says: "All I wish to caution you against, is, that abstaining, as the bank does, from all connexion with what are called politics, you will confine your efforts exclusively to the distribution of what may be explanatory of the operations and conduct of the bank."

Here was a very pretty, and a very positive declaration, with which the whitewashing committee might commence their exhibition of "the account of the Bank of the United States for printing, &c., other than ordinary." To stamp an indelible falsehood on the declaration that the bank, in the elections of 1832, abstained from all political interference, I will quote from the statement of the committee one simple item, as follows:

"Nathan Hale, printing 40,000 copies of Webster's speech at Worcester Convention; 12,500 copies Webster's speech on the bank veto, and stitching, boxes, freight by packet and stages, packing and sending away, \$2,422 65."

Now, I happen to recollect something about this Worcester speech: there was scarcely an individual voter of the State of New Hampshire, who was not, just previous to the November election of 1832, furnished with a copy of this Worcester speech. Such as would not take them from the hands of the runners appointed to distribute them, had them thrown into their door yards, at night. They came into New Hampshire (about the same time their author made us a visit,) just before the day of election, when, too late for contradiction, certain Boston gentlemen kindly certified to us false news relative to the Pennsylvania elections.

This Worcester speech was not confined to a vindication of the bank—it was spoken, printed, and circulated for quite another object; and this object will be best explained by reading a few extracts from it. I read them, Mr. President, to show that Nicholas Biddle practised a most audacious and glaring deception on the Committee of Finance, if by artfully introducing his disclaimer along side of his account, he induced them to believe that he had paid for the circulation only of such articles as were "explanatory of the operations and conduct of the bank."

Extract from Mr. WEBSTER'S speech at the National Republican Convention, in Worcester (Mass.) October 12th, 1832.

"MR. PRESIDENT: I take the hazard of the reputation of an alarmist. I cheerfully submit to the imputation of over-excited apprehension. I discard all fear of the cry of false prophecy, and I declare that, in my judgment, not only the great interests of the country, but the constitution itself, is in imminent peril, and that nothing can save either the one or the other, but that voice which has authority to say to the evils of misrule and mis-government, hitherto shall ye come, but no farther.

"Sir, we see one State of the Union openly threatening to arrest the execution of the revenue laws of the Union, by acts of her own. This proceeding is threatened, not by irresponsible persons, but by those who fill her chief places of power and trust.

"In another State, free citizens of the country are imprisoned, and held in prison in defiance of a judgment of the Supreme Court, pronounced for their deliverance. Immured in

a dungeon, marked, and despatched as subjects of a penitentiary punishment, these citizens pass their days in counting the slow revolving hours of their miserable captivity, and their nights in feverish and delusive dreams of their homes, and their own families; while the constitution stands adjudged to be violated, a law of Congress is effectually repealed by the act of a State, and a judgment of deliverance by the Supreme Court is set at nought, and contemned.

"Treaties, importing the most solemn and sacred obligations, are deemed to have binding force.

"A feeling that there is great insecurity for property, and the stability of the means of living extensively prevails.

"The whole subject of the tariff, acted on for the moment, is, at the same moment, declared not to be at rest, but liable to be again moved, and with greater effect, just so soon as power for that purpose shall be obtained.

"The currency of the country, hitherto safe, sound, and universally satisfactory, is threatened with a violent change, and embarrassment in pecuniary affairs, equally distressing and unnecessary, hangs over all the trading and active classes of society.

"A long used, and long approved legislative instrument for the collection of revenue, well secured against abuse, and always responsible to Congress and the laws, is denied further existence; and its place is proposed to be supplied by a new branch of Executive Department, with a money power, controlled and conducted solely by Executive agency.

"Sir, the question is wholly unsettled, and the principles of the administration, according to its most recent avowal of those principles, is adverse to the protecting policy, decidedly hostile to the whole system, root and branch; and this on permanent and alleged constitutional grounds.

"The question, therefore, of the tariff—the question of every tariff—the question between maintaining our agricultural and manufacturing interests where they now are, and breaking up the entire system, and erasing every vestige of it from the statute book, is a question materially to be affected by the pending election."

From this extract it will be seen that the Worcester speech had but little to do with explanations "of the operation and conduct of the bank," but that it lunched at once into all the exciting topics which were calculated to influence the then pending election. We may very much admire the boldness of the speaker who could "cheerfully submit to the imputation of over excited apprehension,"—who could "discard all fear of the cry of false prophecy"—who could declare the country and the constitution, every thing we hold dear, to be in "imminent peril;" and who, on that great occasion, threw himself into the breach; but we must detest that hypocrisy, whether it be of the bank or its friends, which continues to declare and reiterate that the publication and gratuitous circulation of forty thousand such speeches, just on the eve of the presidential election, was no interference with politics.

Why, Mr. President, this speech was like Antony's funeral oration over the dead body of Cæsar; it opened the "poor dumb wounds" of the bleeding country, and roused the men of Massachusetts, who had long been taught to consider Andrew Jackson as the veriest tyrant, the most hard-hearted oppressor that ever existed in this or any other country, to such an effort as that State had not made since the time when its Legislature resolved it to be "unbecoming a moral and religious people to rejoice" at the successes of our gallant army and navy, in the war of 1812; it was such an exciting appeal as would almost move the rocks to mutiny. This Worcester speech in 1832, was but the commencement of the gloomy predictions followed up in 1834. The administration decidedly "hostile to the protecting policy," and "embarrassment in pecuniary affairs, equally distressing and unnecessary, hangs

over all the trading and active classes of society." How often did we hear during the panic session of Congress, that the estimates of the Treasury were overrated; that there would be a great falling off in the revenue; that confidence was destroyed; industry paralyzed; commerce suspended; that the withdrawal of the deposits had changed the face of the country from a scene of unparalleled prosperity to a scene of unparalleled desolation; that the commercial towns were deserted; orders for goods were countermanded; foreign purchases stopped, etc? Now mark how a plain tale shall disprove all these predictions. The imports and exports of the last five years show that the business of the country has at no time been so prosperous and so extensive as in the two years since the withdrawal of the deposits.

Yr's	Value of imports in the U. S. of foreign articles	Exports of domestic articles.	Exports of foreign articles.	Total exports of foreign and domestic articles
1831	\$97,032,858	\$62,048,233	\$18,324,333	\$80,372,566
'32	100,652,677	63,074,815	23,963,128	87,037,943
'33	109,000,000	70,641,930	20,021,373	90,663,303
'34	127,093,351	74,441,629	22,874,295	97,315,924
'35	119,875,918	101,189,982	20,564,495	121,693,577

Our imports and exports have fully kept pace with the increase of our population; the former exceeding the latter in about the ratio of profits on foreign traffic, including the products of the sea, earned and secured by our enterprising fishermen and sailors. Since the commencement of the present administration, the annual imports have increased from about seventy-four millions to one hundred and fifty millions of dollars; the country is prospered as no other nation ever was prospered, in spite of the efforts to throw embarrassments in the way. Surely something must be due to the administration, since it was to the administration that all the anticipated misery and desolation were charged!

There was some little sophism in charging on the President and his friends the acts of those who filled the "chief places of power" in a southern State, that has acted for the last few years almost entirely in concert with those who sustain "the chief places of power" in Massachusetts; but we must pardon something to this liberty taken by the orator, when we consider that he cheerfully submitted "to the imputation of over excited apprehension," and ingeniously contrived to unite the case of the imprisoned missionaries in another State with the nullification of South Carolina. The story told of the "slow revolving hours of their miserable captivity," of their "feverish and delusive dreams of their homes," was in admirable keeping with the efforts that had been made for the purpose of producing collision between the Governments of the State of Georgia and of the United States, by citizens of Massachusetts, who had prosecuted the suit and obtained an *ex parte* trial and decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.

One small circumstance the Worcester orator seems not to have adverted to; and as that would have spoiled the effect of his moving appeal, the knowing ones readily excuse the omission; and that is, that these poor imprisoned missionaries,

from the moment of their trial and conviction, were tendered by the competent authorities the offer of release and pardon, on the simple condition that they would either take an oath to support the laws of the State of Georgia, or consent to leave the State without taking such oath. But let that pass.

The speaker does, indeed, refer to the "instrument for the collection of revenue, well secured against abuse, and always responsible to Congress and the laws," for the purpose of passing an encomium upon the bank. The last report of the committee presents but a sad commentary upon his allegation of *security against abuse*; and, as if the bank itself was predetermined to falsify the praises of its very best friends, and to extend the range of infractions of the charter to its utmost width, it has since even refused to acknowledge that *responsibility to Congress*, expressly named in its charter, by denying to a committee of the House of Representatives all access to its books and its proceedings.

But the question of the tariff was a subject of high excitement to Massachusetts and the North; and the Worcester speech, for the purpose of alarming the people, declares, in effect, that the then pending election will decide the fate of the "agricultural and manufacturing interests," that "the breaking up the entire system, and erasing every vestige of it from the statute book," will result from the failure of his party. Here was a subject that appealed directly to the citizens of New England; and the false attitude in which it was placed—false, as has been demonstrated by subsequent events—was calculated to mislead or deceive the people. The bank might evince a temporary cunning by pouring out its money to circulate among the people information calculated to alarm their fears and work up their already "over excited apprehensions." Was this not interference in politics—a most unjustifiable interference?

I again turn to the bank's Worcester speech

"Among the great interests of the country, Mr. President, there is one, which appears to me not to have attracted, from the people of this Commonwealth, a degree of attention, altogether equal to its magnitude.

"Mr. President, among the bills which failed, at the last session, for want of the President's approval, was one in which this State had a great pecuniary interest. It was the bill for the payment of interest to these States, the funds advanced by them during the war, the principal of which had been paid, or assumed, by the Government of the United States.

"But where a State has so direct and so heavy an interest, where the justice of the case is so plain that men agree in it who agree in hardly any thing else, where her claim has passed Congress, without considerable opposition in either House, a refusal to approve the bill without giving the slightest reason, and he taking the advantage of the rising of Congress to give it a silent go-by, is an act that may well awaken the attention of the people in the States concerned.

"The principles of the administration are hostile to internal improvements. Here is another power, heretofore exercised in many instances, now denied. The administration now denies the power, except with qualifications, which cast an air of ridicule over the whole subject; being founded on such distinctions as between salt water and fresh water; places above custom-houses and places below; and others equally extraordinary."

Here we find the bank taking ground in favor of a bill in which Massachusetts had a "great pecuniary interest." We all supposed Massachusetts had been well paid for her claims for ser-

vices during the late war when she obtained nearly half a million of dollars under the administration of Andrew Jackson. She got from him what she never could obtain under an administration at the head of which was one of her own citizens; and now she complains that interest on that claim is not allowed her! All who can remember the history of our country twenty years, must recollect the nature of these Massachusetts claims. Besides the interest on what was allowed, she has behind a claim for principal amounting to probably more than half a million of dollars. When she gets the interest on one, she will claim the principal of the other; and to that will succeed another claim for interest upon the last sum. It is believed that Massachusetts has received quite as much for her war claims as she was ever entitled to; and as for the other States, claiming a balance of interest, it is well known that much was allowed them in those settlements which was expended without the authority of the General Government, and was exclusively the expenditure of the State. If the bill allowing interest on claims to the States, together with the land bill of 1832, had become laws, it is quite certain the Government would have been obliged to resort to loans, or to increased direct or indirect taxes. The vetoes of the President, having also partially checked appropriations for internal improvements in some States, to the entire exclusion of other States, has probably already saved to the people an extraordinary expenditure of the public money to the amount of more than a hundred millions of dollars.

We next find the bank's speech laying in strong claims for its friends to the title of conservators of the public liberty:

"Sir, our condition is singularly paradoxical. We have an administration opposed to the constitution; we have an opposition which is the main support of the Government and the laws. We have an administration which denies to the very Government which it administers powers which it has exercised for forty years; it denies the protecting power, the bank power, and the power of internal improvement. The great and leading measures of the national legislature are all resisted by it. These, strange as it may seem, depend on the opposition for support. We have, in truth, an opposition without which it would be difficult for the Government to get along at all. I appeal to every member of Congress present (and I am happy to see many here) to say, what would now become of the Government if all members of the opposition were withdrawn from Congress. For myself, I declare my own conviction that its continuance might probably be very short. Take away the opposition from Congress, and let us see what probably would be done the first session. The tariff would be entirely repealed. Every enactment having protection by duties as its main object, would be struck from the statute book. This would be the first thing done. Every work of internal improvement would be stopped. This would follow as a matter of course. The bank would go down, and a treasury money agency would take its place. The judiciary act of 1789 would be repealed, so that the Supreme Court should exercise no power of revision over State decisions. And who would resist the doctrines of NULLIFICATION? Look, sir, to the votes of Congress for the last three years, and you will see that each of these things would, in all human probability, take place at the next session, if the opposition were to be withdrawn. The constitution is threatened, therefore—imminently threatened—by the very fact that those are entrusted with its administration who are hostile to its essential powers."

Here we find the *virtues* of the opposition set off in striking contrast to the *vices* of the friends of the administration; who dare dispute in relation to the bank, that

"Even its failings leaned to virtue's side," when the virtues of the immaculate minority, whose

cause it espoused, are taken into consideration. If it be a failing, after the positive asseverations of the president of the bank and the Board of Directors, that they would abstain from all interference in politics, that failing must be overlooked when we consider that the opposition which they supported were the "main support of the Government and the laws," and that "without this opposition, it would be difficult for the Government to get along at all!" "The constitution was threatened, imminently threatened," and there was none but the opposition who could "resist the doctrines of nullification." What could the bank do better than furnish funds to print and distribute forty thousand, a hundred thousand, a million of speeches, to save the Union, the constitution, every thing we hold dear?

Great as was the danger—quite equal to total darkness, the absence of all good—from the friends of the administration in Congress, there was a greater evil from the attempt to extend the power of the Executive; and the bank had an excuse for doing any thing, even usurping power itself, to put down Executive usurpation. Let us see what it has to offer on this subject.

"But, sir, in my opinion, a yet greater danger threatens the constitution and the Government, and that is from the attempt to extend the power of the Executive at the expense of all the other branches of the Government, and of the people themselves. Whatever accustomed power is denied to the constitution—whatever accustomed power is denied to Congress or the Judiciary, none is denied to the Executive. Here, there is no retrenchment; here, no apprehension is felt for the liberties of the people; here, it is not thought necessary to erect barriers against corruption.

"I begin, sir, with the subject of removals from office for opinion's sake—as I think, one of the most signal instances of the attempt to extend the Executive power. This has been a leading measure, a cardinal point, in the course of administration. It has proceeded, from the first, on a settled system of proscription for political opinions; and this system it has carried into operation to the full extent of its ability. The President has not only filled all vacancies with his own friends, generally those most distinguished as personal partisans, but he has turned out political opponents, and thus created vacancies, in order that he might fill them with his own friends. I think the number of removals and appointments is said to be two thousand. While the administration and its friends have been attempting to circumscribe and decry the powers belonging to other branches, it has seized into its own hands a patronage most pernicious and corrupting, an authority over men's means of living most tyrannical and odious, and a power to punish freemen for political opinions altogether intolerable.

"And what did we witness, sir, when the administration actually commenced, in the full exercise of its authority! One universal sweep, one undistinguished blow, levelled against all who were not of the successful party. No worth, public or private; no service, civil or military, was of power to resist the relentless greediness of proscription. Soldiers of the late war, soldiers of the revolutionary war, the very contemporary of the liberties of the country, all lost their situations. No office was too high, and none too low; for office was the spoil, and all the spoils. It was said, belonged to the victors!"

The administration has been guilty of the unpardonable sin of preferring its friends to its enemies in making appointments to office; nay, it has hardly done this, for it is well known a large share of the patronage and the offices of the present administration have been bestowed on those who are any thing but friends. Will the bank please to look in any direction where its friends have the ascendancy? do they allow their opponents any favor when they have the power? Turn to Philadelphia, where even the humble watchmen were turned out in droves; at New York, where the municipal agents were changed, and even carmen denied their accustomed employ; at Connecticut,

where in almost the same breath some three hundred judges, justices, and other officers were driven from office during the panic year; at even the State of Massachusetts, where especial good care is taken that no friend of the administration shall receive any lucrative or honorable appointment. The bank, without doubt, might be brought to consent, in some instances, to the appointment of friends of the administration; but the conditions on which it would grant favors would be well understood to be the same as were made to Webb and Noah, and to Jasper Harding, when it loaned the one some seventy thousand, and the other some twenty-four thousand dollars, without competent security; they must consent to be sold, soul and body, to the enemy!

We turn to another topic of the bank's Worcester production:

"And is a press that is purchased or pensioned, more free than a press that is fettered? Can the people look for truths to partial sources, whether rendered partial through fear or through favor? Why shall not a manacled press be trusted with the maintenance and defence of popular rights? Because it is to be supposed to be under the influence of a power which may prove greater than the love of truth. Such a press may screen abuses in Government, or be silent. It may fear to speak. And may it not fear to speak, too, when its conductors, if they speak in any but one way, may lose their means of livelihood? Is dependence on Government for bread no temptation to screen its abuses? Will the press always speak the truth, though the truth, if spoken, may be the means of silencing it for the future? Is the truth in no danger? Is the watchman under no temptation, when he can neither proclaim the approach of national evils, nor seem to decry them, without the loss of his place?"

"Some fifty or sixty editors of leading journals have been appointed to office by the present Executive. A stand has been made against this proceeding in the Senate, with partial success; but by means of appointments which do not come before the Senate, or other means, the number has been carried to the extent I have mentioned.

"There can, sir, be no objection to the appointment of an editor to office, if he is the fittest man. There can be no objection to considering the services which, in that or any other capacity, he may have rendered his country. But the ground of complaint is, that the aiding, by the press, of the election of an individual, is rewarded by that same individual with the gift of moneyed offices. Men are turned out of office and others put in, and receive salaries from the public Treasury on the ground, either openly avowed or falsely denied, that they have rendered services in the election of the very individual who makes this removal and makes this appointment. Every man, sir, must see that this is a fatal stab at the purity of the press."

How does the Bank stand condemned from its own mouth? Has it not directly bought up newspapers and editors like cattle in the market? Where the administration has employed editors to the amount of hundreds, the bank has done the same thing to the amount of thousands. The bank has paid money directly to newspaper editors and others for electioneering services, a portion of which was the money of the Government. When has the administration done as much? Never!

But the President has occasionally appointed editors of newspapers to office; and the ground of complaint is, that the aiding by the press of the election of an individual, is rewarded by that same individual with the gift of moneyed offices. Now let us put another case, which might have happened. Suppose the forty thousand Worcester speeches had accomplished their intended object, and placed a certain candidate in the chair of the President; and let us suppose for these services, for this speaking and writing, and the bank for

publishing, that "the aiding, by the press, of the election of an individual, is rewarded by that same individual with the gift of moneyed offices." Wherein would the two cases differ? Yet in the last mentioned event, we should have witnessed no mawkish display of affected fear of corruption, such as stands out so prominent in the cases just quoted.

Again hear the bank *versus* the right of the President's veto:

"If the President is at liberty to negative any, or all of these laws, at pleasure, or rather to refuse to render the bills laws, by approving them, and still may neglect to return them to Congress for renewed action, he will hold a very important control over the legislation of this country."

"A silent veto on the Bank bill would have been the inevitable fate of that bill, if its friends had not refused to fix on any term for adjournment before the President should have had the bill so long as to be required, by constitutional provisions, to sign it, or to send it back with his reasons for not signing it. The two Houses did not agree, and could not agree, to fix a day for adjournment, until the bill was sent to the President, and then care was taken to fix on such a day as should allow him the whole constitutional period. This seasonable presentment rescued the bill from the power of the silent negative."

Fortunate had it been for the bank if it had taken measures that the "inevitable fate" of the bank bill had been a silent veto! Never was there a State paper sought for with such avidity by the people—never did any public document, in so short a space of time, throw so great a flood of light over the community, as did the veto message of the President. "A silent veto" was prevented, and the bank intended it for evil; but an unerring Providence turned that evil into good.

One more extract from the bank's electioneering document, and I am done with that:

"If the President be re-elected, with concurrent and co-operating majorities in both houses of Congress, I do not see that, in four years more, all the powers which is suffered to remain in the Government, will be held by the Executive hand. Nullification will proceed, or will be put down by a power as unconstitutional as itself. The revenues will be managed by a Treasury bank—the use of the veto will be considered as sanctioned by the public voice—the Senate, if not 'cut down,' will be bound down; and commanding the army and the navy, and holding all places of trust to be party property, what will then be left, sir, for constitutional reliance?"

"I fully believe, sir, that a great majority of the nation desire a change in the administration, and that it will be difficult for party organization or party denunciation to suppress the effective utterance of that general wish.

"I fully believe, sir, that gratifying intelligence is already on the wing. While we are yet deliberating in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania is voting. To-day she elects her members to the next Congress. I doubt not the result of that election will show an important change in public sentiment in that State. I cannot doubt that the great States adjoining her holding similar constitutional principles, and having similar interests, will feel the impulse of the same causes which affects her.

"At least, sir, let the star of Massachusetts be the last which shall be seen to fall from heaven, and to plunge into the utter darkness of disunion. Let her shrink back—let her hold others back, if she can—at any rate let her keep herself back from this gulf, full at once of fire and of blackness; yes, sir, as far as human foresight can scan, or human imagination fathom, full of the fire and the blood of civil war, and of the thick darkness of general political disgrace, ignominy, and ruin."

The prediction that "a great majority of the nation desired a change" of the administration, was quite as true as was the anticipation that in four years more "all the power which is suffered to remain in the Government will be held by the Executive hand," or that "nullification will proceed." And if the nation has been kept back from the "gulf, full, at once of fire and blackness," "and the blood of civil war, and of the

thick darkness of general political disgrace, ignominy and ruin," it is most apparent that neither the "star of Massachusetts," nor the Bank of the United States, nor yet the forty thousand Worcester speeches which the bank paid for printing and circulating, have in anywise tended to avert those calamities.

Such, Mr. President, is a sample of the leading contents of the Worcester speech—one of the greatest efforts ever made to influence the result of one of the most important elections that ever took place in this or any other country; a giant effort, which, if it had not been manifestly on the wrong side, must have been attended with all the success that the right deserves. Let it be remembered that this great electioneering effort was made by the bank in the year 1832: let it be remembered that since that time, (to wit, in December, 1833,) the Board of Directors, by a solemn vote, has declared "*The bank has never interfered in the slightest degree in politics, and never influenced or sought to influence elections;*" that this vote has been backed up, so far as positive assertion would go, by the friends of the bank in both Houses of Congress, and that the positive declaration has been, both before and since, repeated by the president of bank. Remembering this, what dependance can be placed on the trust of the avowments of any committee who shall believe that the president of the bank and the Board of Directors acting under him, would not conceal from them all the truth that made against them which they knew would not get out in spite of their utmost efforts?

Mr. President, I have shown you that the caption of the whitewashing committee, introducing that part of the expenditures of the Bank of the United States paid for printing, &c. is a *misnomer*, leading to a false issue—disgraceful to the Board of Directors, if intended as a deception on the committee, and little creditable to the intelligence of the committee itself, if suffered to be there, placed without a full understanding of its import.

Meagre as is the information contained in the list of expenditures, presented by the bank; reluctantly as was extorted the skeleton of facts which the bank found it impossible longer to conceal; it is, nevertheless, a document of immense magnitude in assisting us rightly to estimate the value of his services, who has eminently contributed to put an end to this institution.

I will only read a few items of the long list, for the purpose of making a passing comment upon them. The whole list ought to be published in every newspaper of the Union: it ought to be stereotyped and published at the beginning of every session of Congress, as of itself a most conclusive reason against making any such grant as was contained in the act of 1816, establishing the Bank of the United States.

The first item of printing commences with the year 1829: it is the following:

"To Garden and Thompson, for triennial report, &c., \$24 87.

This Garden and Thompson, who subsequently received from the bank their hundreds and their thousands of dollars for different jobs, are understood to have published a weekly newspaper,

called the "Mechanics' Free Press," then the only newspaper in the city of Philadelphia, opposed to the recharter of the United States Bank. The opposition of that paper was soon silenced. It will be seen that the course of the bank has been not less to reward its friends than to buy up its enemies.

According to this statement, the whole expense for extraordinary printing in the year 1829 was only \$105 25.

In the first half year of 1830, there was paid for printing and distributing Smith and McDuffie's reports to the two Houses of Congress, in favor of the bank, \$3,285 17. Among the items, Garden and Thompson print to the value of \$1,685 75. P. P. F. Degrand, a foreigner and broker at Boston, whose officious interference in all matters relating to elections, has been long well known in New England, furnished the same to the amount of \$250; and N. Biddle's bill for distributing, &c. [Could " &c." mean writing and preparing reports?] was \$700.

The second half year, (all for Smith and McDuffie's reports, and Gallatin's pamphlet,) amounts to \$2,591 50. Again we have a payment to Garden and Thompson of \$691; to N. Biddle for distributing McDuffie's report, \$275—to the same for printing Gallatin's pamphlet, \$1000. There can be little doubt, the truth is falsified here: the sum of \$1000 was probably paid for *writing* the report, because E. Littell, in the very next line, is paid "for printing the same, \$300." Mr. Degrand again comes in for distributing Gallatin's pamphlet, \$300.

The expense for extraordinary printing in 1830, is given at \$5,876 67.

In 1831, for the first half year, the expenditures swelled to the large amount of \$10,401 74. Benton's speech in the Senate, *which was not answered in that body by the friends of the bank*, had gone forth and been published in most of the democratic newspapers of the country. The bank immediately set to work, and employed writers and reviewers, and printers, to counteract the effect of that speech. Hitherto the bank had gone on very quietly, paying for the circulation of extra reports made in both Houses of Congress, by committees friendly to it: these reports invariably presented precisely such, and no other facts and arguments, than could be elaborated from the partial statements of the bank itself. But the repetition of the opinion expressed by the President, that the bank ought not to be rechartered, and the general publication of Benton's speech in 1830-31, created a necessity that the bank should arouse its friends in all parts of the country.

This account commences with a payment to Gales and Seaton for printing and distributing Mr. Gallatin's pamphlet, \$1,300; \$2,000 to Nicholas Biddle for the distribution of Smith and McDuffie's reports; \$733 75 for distributing the same at New York; \$123 to Gray and Bowen of Boston for 2000 copies review of bank report in the North American Review. It will be borne in mind that the bank not only subsidized the newspaper press, but that the principal reviews of the

country, which should be devoted to subjects purely scientific and literary, and which claim confidence for their impartiality, were paid for blind-folding the people in relation to the true designs and intents of that institution. Jesper Harding in this half year receives \$440 for 11,000 extra papers. His paper, the Pennsylvania Inquirer, had taken ground in favor of the administration: it became important that its influence should be purchased into the interest of the bank. It was so purchased. Not only was Jesper Harding employed in jobs of printing to a considerable amount, but he was suffered to contract a debt, as appears in another part of the report of the committee, of \$23,490 40, without security for its payment, and not one cent of it probably ever was, or ever will be paid.

"James Wilson, 25,000 copies of McDuffie's report, and 25,000 address to the State Legislatures, folding, &c., \$1,447 75.

This James Wilson lived west of the Alleghanies, and these publications were intended to influence public opinion in Ohio, Kentucky, and the great west. The report very prudently omits to state that the original bill showed that these 25,000 copies each of Messrs. McDuffie and Smith's reports and addresses to members of the State Legislatures, were furnished "agreeably to order, and letters from John Sargeant, Esq." and that this gentleman was the bank's candidate for Vice President, who came here during the panic winter at the head of a committee, demanding, in the name of the State of Pennsylvania, the restoration of the deposits to the bank. That fact is shown in the memorial of the Government directors to both Houses of Congress, in December, 1833.

"To Carey and Lea, for printing Professor Tucker's article, and 1000 of Gallatin on banking, \$2,850."

These gentlemen, now that their occupation as bank publishers is about to terminate, were to be provided for by the subscription which the Joint Library Committee had reported in their favor, for five hundred copies of the History of Congress.

The extra printing for the last half of 1831 amounted only to \$751 50½, a large portion of which was paid simply to editors for publishing reports in their newspapers, which, ordinarily, would have gone in as a matter of course: thus Duff Green (then supposed to be opposed to the bank) is paid \$28 for publishing the report of the stockholders; E. [presumed H.] Niles receives \$70 for publishing in the Weekly Register (a paper that contains no advertisements) the report of the Bank of the United States; Garden and Thompson again for publishing report of stockholders [in their newspaper probably] and extras \$191 57; James Wilson (the peculiarly favored printer of the State) for publishing report of stockholders, \$63 75. In this way editors were paid for services that cost them nothing; for inserting matter such as is usually given in a newspaper as general information, and without expectation of pay—a very considerable amount. In this manner "golden opinions" were bought, and almost every editor,

gratitude for the almost unasked generosity of the bank, was induced to espouse its cause with zeal.

The total amount for printing in 1831, as per the bank's account, was \$11,153 24½.

In 1832, the first half year presents only 1990 85. Of these there are two items to Carey Lea, one for paper and extra binding, of 150 50, and the other for expenses (writing the article probably,) attending Quarterly Review, 7 orders, \$100. Gales & Seaton come in with a charge of \$800 for 20,000 copies of "a pamphlet concerning the bank," and \$360 for 1000 copies of McDuffie's and Adams's Reports.

For the last half year the expense was \$16,499 4½. It commences with the well known name of Jesper Harding, for printing review of the veto, *and expenses incident thereto*, (meaning, in all likelihood, pay for writing,) and 200 handbills, ordered by Col. J. \$321 78; Edward Olmsted, bank documents, \$624 11; same for printing review, \$418 25. On inquiry, I find that this Mr. Olmsted is neither editor or printer, but a lawyer, acting as treasurer for a "Young Men's Clay Committee," a body especially constituted to operate in the elections. John S. Riddle, for printing and circulating reports of McDuffie, Smith, Adams, and the Secretary of the Treasury, the speech of Webster on the President's veto, and review of the veto message, is paid \$2,580 50. This Mr. Riddle was neither printer, editor, or lawyer, but a merchant, and *Treasurer of the Old Men's Clay Committee*, appointed, like the other, to operate on the elections. William Fry, printer of the National Gazette, is also paid \$1,708 for 3,100 Webster's speech on the veto message, and \$501 60 for 22,800 Adams's and McDuffie's reports. James Wilson, of Pittsburg, is paid 580 "for printing done for the bank," as per his own account rendered. This item leaked out in consequence of another gentleman of the same name taking the letter from the post office, and sending in it Mr. Biddle's draft. Wilson denied the purpose of this payment at the time, by equivocation; but after the election had passed, the truth came out.

William A. Merwin, printing *General Jackson's veto*, 30,000 copies, wrapping and distributing them, \$558."

This the chairman of the committee informed me, as we may well suppose, was a mistake; it should be "*General Jackson vetoed* 30,000 copies." This expenditure was in the city of New York. After this comes the charge of Nathan Hale, of Boston, for 40,600 copies of Webster's Worcester speech, and 12,500 copies of Webster's speech on bank veto, &c., amounting to \$2,422 65; and two items, amounting to \$766 49, for printing in German, extracts from Webster's speech and other articles. The attempt to argue the German population into a belief of the necessity and utility of the bank, or to enlist them in a crusade against General Jackson and the democracy, was an utter failure.

The expense for 1832 was \$18,490 79½. The first half of 1833, presents charges for \$1,305, and

the last half amounts to \$1,883 03. Of this, Gales and Seaton have \$1,895 for 50,000 bank report and other documents, and William Fry has \$870 for two items of charge in bank reports. Total expense for the year, quite moderate, is \$2,193 03.

But it is the account for the memorable year of 1834 that presents the most audacious attempt to excite public opinion and influence the elections, that ever has come within my observation. The items for the first half year are such as should attract universal attention. Considering what took place day after day within the Capitol during the first six months of the year 1834, and looking at the following items in the bank's account, can we be surprized at the great agitation which prevailed? Was the like of this ever before presented? Every item of this unparalleled account should be repeated:

For first half year ending 30th June, viz:	
To Buff Green, for printing 50,000 copies of Webster's report of the Committee of Finance	\$1,750 00
25,000 copies of Clay's speech on deposits	1,000 00
50,000 Calhoun's speech on do.	1,000 00
50,000 McDuffie's speech on do.	1,000 00
50,000 additional of Calhoun's	1,000 00
15,000 additional of McDuffie's	450 00
	<hr/> \$6,200 00
Gales and Seaton, for 9,500 Clay's speech	570 00
50,000 H. Binney's do.	3,000 00
3,000 of Southard's do.	235 43
5,000 of Huntington's do.	208 00
10,000 of Webster's do.	288 90
10,000 second edition of Southard's do.	634 10
3,000 Poindexter's do.	68 98
3,000 Sprague's do.	103 47
3,000 Frelinghuysen's do.	68 23
1,000 Bwing's do.	67 32
6,000 do. do., second edition	243 12
10,000 of Binney's report on the pension fund.	283 90
20,000 Senate's report on deposits	577 90
7,000 Poindexter's do., second edition, and 10,000 do. Webster's	524 82
10,000 Archer's speech on bank question, for binding, paper, envelopes, &c. for Binney and others	288 90
	<hr/> \$7,129 52
Paper and folding	261 29
50,000 copies of Mr. Adams's speech	2,850 00
5,000 copies speech of Allen, of Kentucky,	268 60
2,000 additional of Allen's do.	102 64
2,000 Corwin's speech	102 64
5,000 Leigh's speech on Protest	125 00
1,000 Clayton's do. on the bank	40 00
3,000 Clay's last speech on bank	56 20
1,000 McKennon's speech	58 29
2,500 pamphlets Mr. Webster's do.	296 90
10,000 do. Wilde's do.	355 20
Printing extra half sheet containing statements concerning the bank, 8,100 copies	54 50
10,000 copies Webster's speech on renewal bank charter	192 60
5,000 do. Leigh's on do.	104 50
5,000 do. Leigh's do., 8 pages added,	156 45
	<hr/> \$5,033 29
3,000 copies Dixon's speech	122 22
75,000 do. Webster's speech on power assumed over the bank by the Executive,	2,651 60
5,000 Hadden's speech	326 48
Paper, seals, envelopes, &c.	34 00
	<hr/> \$3,429 70
William Fry, for 1,000 National Gazettes, and printing report Ex. Committee,	742 50
Commercial Herald, for printing Adams, Binney, and Webster's speeches,	112 00
C. Alexander, for printing report of Exchange Committee.	40 00
	<hr/> \$894 50
National Printing do., and Adams's speech,	45 00

N. Hale, for 2,000 copies Adams' speech	95 50
W. B. Townsend, for 50,000 copies report Exchange Committee	1,375 00
	\$1,515 50
	<u>\$21,252 51</u>

Here is \$6,200 to one printer, and \$15,642 51 to another, for printing speeches which had no other object than to produce or increase excitement in every part of the United States. The amount paid to the same printers, under orders of the two Houses of Congress, was enormous; every thing was printed that could be made to bear on the question; and extraordinary numbers of every thing that could be supposed to have an effect, were ordered to be furnished at the public expense. That, however, was not enough; the bank must pay for and circulate additional numbers of reports of committees; and thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands of speeches calculated to alarm the people—to exasperate such of them against the Executive as supposed their interests had been touched—to either lash them into fury or overwhelm them in despondency—to either upturn the whole business of the country, and involve its citizens in a common ruin, or else to seize upon and control the Government. It would be well indeed for the bank if it could show that its president and directors had no hand in this imposition; it would be to the credit of members of Congress, who made such speeches as the bank should consider it an object to print and circulate in her justification, if they could now show that the institution they praise was as pure, as useful, as indispensable as they represented it to be.

The items of charge are brought down to the 30th September, 1834. The expenditures of the last quarter were \$2,031 50; this added to \$24-252 51 for the two first quarters, makes the aggregate amount for the three first quarters of the year \$26,284 01.

Let us see what was the aid furnished by the bank to assist members of Congress in their several sections of country. Every speech was circulated without stint that could be supposed to operate. It was declared, and repeated here and elsewhere, that President Jackson had scarcely a friend left south of the Potomac—that the measure of removing the deposits was universally condemned by the entire South. That the South might understand the reasons why they ought to pass sentence of condemnation on the President and the Secretary of the Treasury—that the proceedings of the Executive might be nullified at once, the bank furnished 107,000 speeches of one South Carolina gentleman, and 65,000 of another. To operate on old Virginia—to present her the "awful alternative" which had hedged her in—to convince her that the evils of a violated constitution are a mere trifle when compared with that destruction which must follow the removal of the deposits from an unconstitutional bank—afforded a thousand speeches of one, and ten thousand of another of her Senators, are circulated. A member of Georgia, ("Wills") whose fortune it has been to suffer martyrdom in the cause of the bank, was, by the same bank,

enabled to speak in his own and the bank's behalf ten thousand times, in as many speeches, for the benefit of that State. Mississippi was furnished with ten thousand of her Senator's, which like a child over-fed with kindness, she repaid only with deep ingratitude. Kentucky comes in for thirty-seven thousand five hundred and ninety-nine from a member of the upper House, seven thousand from one, and five thousand from another member of the House of Representatives, and she has really evinced a more efficient gratitude to the bank than any other State of the Union. She is the only instance of conclusive demonstration, that a moneyed monopoly can control the voice of a whole community. Whether she will persevere in fighting the battles of the bank, is quite uncertain. Pennsylvania has always been highly favored of the bank, and most ungrateful was she at first for the continued kindness. Fifty thousand speeches and ten thousand reports from a great champion of the bank, aided by one thousand extra speeches from another, of her members from the west of her mountains, scarcely produced a vibration of sentiment in the Keystone State. She has, however, made amends for all by suffering a minority of her people to elect such a Legislature as has thrown itself into the arms of Old Nick, and granted what he could not obtain here: a chartered monopoly of thirty-five millions of dollars, calculated to grind into the dust and oppress the people of that State.

"The canal a solitude and the lake a desert waste of waters," comes in from Ohio in the shape of 7,000 appeals from a Senator, and 2,000 speeches from a Representative—all paid for and circulated by the bank. But the young lion of the west, in spite of all, declares its independence of the bank. New Jersey had the benefit of 13,000 from one, and 3,000 from another of her Senators; but, "calm as a summer's morning," one of these Senators yields his place in this body. In the other House of Congress, and in her legislature she supports the administration and the veto of the bank. Little Delaware, although considered safe, was deemed much more sure with 1,000 speeches of her able Senator; and as a "miss is as good as a mile," fourteen votes, in a general canvass of the State, only stood between her and her emancipation from the rule of the bank. To the empire State of New York, meagerly supported with a single 3,000 edition of one near sighted speech from its anti-masonic region, is furnished 50,000 of the mendacious report of the Exchange Committee, for which the press of the secretary of the Hartford convention receives from the bank \$1,375 as a largess. Connecticut gets no compliment from the bank in the Senate; but 5,000 speeches of one of her members of the House could not prevent her from uniting with those legislature which have directed their Senators to vote for expurgating the condemnatory resolution of the Senate from its Journal. Vermont and New Hampshire receive no compliment from the bank in thousands or even hundreds of published speeches; nor was it necessary, for the first was deemed sufficiently subservient without further training; and the Granite State was too incor-

rigidly obstinate in her opposition to the bank to thank Mr. Biddle for any compliment of the kind. Rhode Island was then thought safe without purchasing the speeches, as she needed not to purchase either of her Senators, for none were more faithful to the bank in their votes. The people of that State now repudiate the bank, while the bank is able to retain two Senators for the entire term of three years, and one of them for five years. Massachusetts (and why should not a part of this go to New Hampshire for what she once was, and what she once contained?)—Massachusetts comes in for greater glorification on account of published speeches, (some of which were and some were not delivered,) and for reports supplying the place of speeches, than any other State of the Union. Indeed, Massachusetts and South Carolina seem to have been honored by the bank beyond any other States; the first probably because in her war against nullification, she had fastened the "strong man in the morass;" and the last for the distinguished love and gratitude she owed that "strong man," thus cruelly fastened, for his services to the banks 70,000, reports of the Finance Committee, 107,500 at least of Webster's, and 52,000 of Adams's undelivered speeches: all these must go to the credit of Massachusetts. But the State of Maine, although last not least, more ungrateful to the bank, if possible, than any of her sisters, because she set the first example, after the panic, of rebelling against her at the polls;—the State of Maine, although money was raised by thousands and tens of thousands in a sister State, to produce a different result, and although honored by the bank in a publication of 3,000 speeches of her Senator, ungratefully and ungenerously refused to elect that Senator to the first office in her gift, or to return such a delegation to Congress as would support the bank.

Mr. President, was there ever a spectacle exhibited before the people that equalled this application of money by the bank to influence and control the elections! Who has the audacity now to admit that the bank did all this, and to declare that the bank never interferes with politics? And the money made use of (one-fifth part at least) was the property of the people of the United States. If the enormous expenditure was not an act of faithlessness towards other stockholders, was it not a high breach of trust to the Government of the United States, which owned one-fifth of the stock of the bank?

Situated as the bank was, while it held the public deposits, and controlled all public disbursements, if it had not expended a cent in publishing speeches and arguments to be circulated among the people, it wielded such an influence, as all other pecuniary interests combined could not command. It completely controlled all the public moneyed institutions of the country; and through them it controlled almost the entire mercantile and commercial community. With this tremendous power, it might have been anticipated that the bank would be content to go into the elections without expending a single dollar in printing, or in the distribution of speeches or documents. Almost the entire mercantile and trad-

ing community was, in many places lashed into a warfare against the administration. Forgetting every thing that was due to the Executive for what it had done to subvert the interests of commerce, to retrieve the property that had been unlawfully seized, and to secure the rights of trade and intercourse in all parts of the world, the merchants, in some of the principal seaports, fought the administration with all the infuriate zeal of madmen. They were goaded on to the contest by the Bank of the United States, which also forced most of the local banks to aid her in the fight.

But, Mr. President, the detail of extraordinary printing which I have exhibited, is not all, nor yet the worst part of the exhibition. That amount is \$65,103 25. The expenditures by the president of the bank, according to his own voluntary confession, for which he renders no vouchers, is \$29,605: If he had no shame for the items he has partially specified in his bill of parcels, what must we suppose to be the use to which he applied the sum for which he rendered no particulars? If a trust be committed to my charge, and I lavish my employer's money for illegitimate purposes, accounting to him specifically for a part, and that part for objects which would reflect on me no credit, and refuse to account at all for the remainder, alleging that a disclosure would expose innocent persons "to vituperation, malign aspersion, and peradventure to personal vengeance," would my employer and patron not have a right to infer the worst of me; and could I, under any pretence, expect my friends seriously to offer for me my reasons for concealment as a ground of confidence to the same or to another employer? We may well suppose that the expenditure for objects entirely concealed was for something even worse than stipends to printers and editors. About the time of the removal of the deposits, the newspapers regularly reported every thing that was going on in the public offices. The proceedings of cabinet meetings were hinted at and alluded to in the bank press throughout the country, as if they were regularly informed of every thing that transpired. Was any portion of the expenditure money paid to secret informers, whose business it was to pry into cabinet secrets?

Nor is the expenditure of \$94,703 25 (one-fifth of which, \$18 941 65 belonged directly to the people of the United States) stated by Mr. Biddle, all the expenditures which have been made. As the record has many times been falsified, I would not be surprised if only a part of the truth has been given in relation to this matter. The expenses at the Bank of the United States for the first half year of 1833, were \$63,861 42; for the second half of the same year the expenses were \$60,646 02; but for the first half year of 1834, the same expenses were \$88,714 03, from twenty-five to thirty thousand dollars beyond the usual amount. These extra expenses, we have a right to presume, until they shall be explained, were made for no honest or laudable purpose.

Besides the extraordinary expenses paid for printing, have we not a right to know how many, and how large sums have been sunk in bad and suspended debts? The committee has shown us

two cases of such lost debt. The one is a debt of Jesper Harding, amounting to \$23,490 40; the other is a debt of J. W. Webb and M. M. Noah, which in several successive discounts, amounted to \$71,575; the committee informs us, that of this debt, \$52,975 has been discharged, leaving \$18,600 still due, on which Webb had given security, by an assignment which is absolutely, under the circumstances, worth nothing. They say a part of the debt has been "discharged"—they do not say it ever has been *paid*. I have ever considered the loan that was made to Webb—a loan which was not entered on the books of the bank, until the president of the bank found the whole matter would be ferreted out—as little short of downright bribery. Let the facts be borne in mind, that Webb's paper, of most extensive circulation, and of a supposed influence greater than any press in the Union, had steadily opposed the bank, until the time this money was furnished; that from this time, at first covertly and insidiously, and by and bye openly, it advocated the recharter of the bank; and what better can we think of this bank, than the worst that has been charged upon it?

In addition to this, Gales & Seaton, in March 1833, owed the Bank of the United States more than \$80,000. This debt would probably have been as bad, or worse off, than that of Jesper Harding, and Webb, and Noah, had not the influence of the bank succeeded in electing these men printers to Congress, in defiance of the public sentiment. Opposition printers were elected in 1833, in both branches of Congress; and the extraordinary fact has resulted from this election of printers, hostile to the administration, that the expense of the public printing has been increased probably ten-fold in the Senate, and in the House alone, greater than it ever was before in both branches.

The committee have mentioned two considerable suspended debts. The loans connected with these must be considered in the same light, and may well be added to the same list, as other "extraordinary expenditures" made for printing, &c. These loans cannot be considered in any other light than the employment of money for the purpose of bribing the public press. Report speaks of other loans of doubtful security, which have been "discharged," not by payment in full, but by security in some sort, of ten, twenty and thirty cents on the dollar. If such loans had been so made and so discharged, in consequence of services of any sort done or to be performed for the bank, can the whitewashing committee give us the assurance that they were made acquainted with the facts? Might not "the possible danger of exposing innocent persons to odium or persecution" have prevented the bank—especially as they might not have been pressed very hard on this point—from making such an exhibit of this kind of accommodations and debts as the case required?

We think we had a right to complain of the report of the committee, not more for the opinions it gives than for those it does not give. We complain of it, that it palliates where it ought to condemn; that it omits facts essential to the case; that where the committee were unwilling to hazard their own reputation in justification, they suffer the party implicated to justify for them-

selves; that where neither the committee nor the bank can make a present pretence of justification, they suffer the bank to throw itself back upon a reputation which, previous to the appalling developments of the last two or three years, it was allowed to possess. We complain that the committee place the effect for the cause; that they offer as an excuse for the violent assault of the bank on the industry and prosperity of the country, those very acts of the administration which were rendered indispensable to the protection of the public from the abuses of the bank. We complain that the committee should characterize the withdrawal of the deposits as a "blow" at the bank, whereas the intention of the bank by holding on to the deposits was the aiming of a more effectual "blow" at the independence of the country and the integrity of the Government.


It was for withdrawing the deposits of the public money from an institution whose management had been thus flagitious—an institution which, in addition to these enormities, withholds at this moment from the people millions of their money—an institution whose whole course for the last four years has been directed with a view to coerce the people into its measures, or bankrupt the whole community; it was for legally and constitutionally arresting the arm of the wrong-doer and preventing the great mischief he intended—that the President of the United States was unlawfully condemned by a vote of the Senate. The people call aloud that the record of this act shall be expunged, and they will not rest until it shall be obliterated. A simple repeal or rescinding of that act will not answer. Nor can the denial of the imputation of crime to the President be now taken as evidence that the passage of the resolution was a mere ordinary matter.

In the month of June, 1834, the Legislature of New Hampshire passed resolutions which declared—

"That the course of the administration and of the President was entirely approved; and that the latter, by his endeavors to restore the constitution to its original purity, by his integrity and firmness, by staying the expenditure of the public money in an unconstitutional system of internal improvements, by settling the tariff on a satisfactory basis, by his resistance of all measures tending to a dissolution of the Union, by his veto on the bank bill, and the stand he has taken against the alarming proceedings of the bank, has proved himself to be a true disciple of Thomas Jefferson, the father of American democracy. That he only exercised a power conferred on him by the constitution, recognised by the example of all his predecessors, when he removed from office the late Secretary of the Treasury, (W. J. Duane.) That the present Secretary of the Treasury, (Roger B. Taney,) in removing the deposits of public money from the Bank of the United States, has violated neither the letter nor the spirit of the charter of the bank; and that his course is fully approved by the people, and was demanded by the profligate conduct of the officers of the bank. That the Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered, because, unconstitutional in its creation, it has proved itself to be an institution of the most dead-







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